US-CERT- AA22-335A: #StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware

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AA22-335A: #StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware

[html]Original release date: December 1, 2022 | Last revised: December 13, 2022

Summary

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:



• Prioritize remediating https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog">known exploited vulnerabilities.

• Train users to recognize and report https://www.cisa.gov/publication/phishing-postcard">phishing attempts.

• Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware">stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

(Updated December 12, 2022) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CISA updated this CSA to include additional indicators of compromise (IOCs) provided by a trusted third party. See table 6. (End of Update.)

The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/211203-2.pdf">FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.

Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as "Cuba ransomware," there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba.

Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase.

This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors.

FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations.

Download the PDF version of this report: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-335a-stopransomware-cuba-ransomware.pdf">pdf, 672 kb.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:

   
• https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA22-335A%20StopRansomware%20Cuba%20Ransomware.stix.xml">AA22-335A.stix (STIX 148 kb).

   
• (Updated December 12, 2022) https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA22-335A-2.stix.xml">AA22-335A-2.stix (STIX, 67 kb). (End of Update.)

Technical Details

Overview

Since the December 2021 release of https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/211203-2.pdf">FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors">critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:

   
• Compromised 101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States.

   
• Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom payments.

Cuba Ransomware Actors' Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors:

   
• Known vulnerabilities in commercial software [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1190/">T1190]

   
• Phishing campaigns [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1566/">T1566]

   
• Compromised credentials [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1078/">T1078]

   
• Legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1563/002/">T1563.002]

After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/software/S0499/">Hancitor—a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims' networks.

Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from victims.[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/atoms/tropicalscorpius/">1],[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cuba-ransomware-tropical-scorpius/">2]

Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cuba-ransomware-tropical-scorpius/">2] Cuba ransomware actors have:

   
• Exploited https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24521">CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges.

   
• Used a PowerShell script to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets offline via Kerberoasting [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1558/003/">T1558.003].

   
• Used a tool, called KerberCache, to extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host's Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) memory [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1003/001/">T1003.001].

   
• Used a tool to exploit https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472">CVE-2020-1472 (also known as "ZeroLogon") to gain Domain Administrative privileges [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1068/">T1068]. This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/software/S0499/">Hancitor and Qbot.

According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, "leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called ApcHelper.sys. This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak." [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1562/001/">T1562.001].[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cuba-ransomware-tropical-scorpius/">2]

In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used "double extortion" techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cuba-ransomware-tropical-scorpius/">2]

Cuba Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace

Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors:

   
• According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began using RomCom malware, a custom RAT, for command and control (C2).[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cuba-ransomware-tropical-scorpius/">2]

   
• Cuba ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According to third-party reporting, suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial Spy ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba ransomware. Before deploying the ransomware, the actors moved laterally using https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/software/S0357/">Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse Shell HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1090/">T1090].

   
• Cuba ransomware actors initially used their leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began selling their data on Industrial Spy's online market for selling stolen data.[https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cuba-ransomware-tropical-scorpius/">2]

RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/10/unattributed-romcom-threat-actor-spoofing-popular-apps-now-hits-ukrainian-militaries">3][https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/11/romcom-spoofing-solarwinds-keepass">4] The actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed domains [https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1584/001/">T1584.001], which allowed the RomCom actors to:

   
• Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for
     
  
        
  • SolarWinds Network Performance Monitor (NPM),
  
        
  • KeePass password manager,
  
        
  • PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and
  
        
  • Advanced IP Scanner software;
  
     
  
     

   
• Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible exploitation or compromise.

Note: For IOCs as of early November 2021, see https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/211203-2.pdf">FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.

   
   
   
   
      
         
         
         
      
   
   
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         
         
         
      
      
         

Table 1: Cuba Ransomware Associated Files and Hashes, as of Late August 2022

File Name		File Path	File Hash
netping.dll	c:\windows\temp		SHA256: f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c
shar.bat			MD5: 4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca           SHA256: a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c
Psexesvc.exe			SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944
1.bat
216155s.dll
23246s.bat			SHA256: 02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8
23246s.dll			SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f
23246st.dll			SHA256: f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710
259238e.exe
31-100.bat
3184.bat
3184.dll
45.dll			SHA256:           857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583
4ca736d.exe
62e2e37.exe
64.235.39.82
64s.dll
7z.sfx
7zCon.sfx
7-zip.chm
82.ps1
9479.bat			SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0
9479p.bat			SHA256: f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a
9479p.ps1			SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17
a.exe			MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3                       SHA1: eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4                       SHA256: 0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3                       SHA256: 0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605                       SHA256: 7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c                       SHA256: af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02
a220.bat
a220.dll			SHA256: 8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3
a82.exe			SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42
a91.exe			SHA256: 3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce
a99.exe			SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b
aa.exe
aa2.exe
aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com
add2.exe
advapi32.dll
agent.13.ps1
agent.bat			SHA256: fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975
agent.dll
agent13.bat
agent13.ps1			SHA256: 1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b
agent64.bin			SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1
agsyst121.bat
agsyst121.dll
all.bat			SHA256: ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a
all.dll			SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4
anet.exe			SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3                       SHA256: 74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84                       SHA256: b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53           SHA256: f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae
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